We distinguish between a collective's goal and a collective goal, concentrating on the latter. Its relations to collective intention and action are spelled out. It is shown how a given goal, when additional predicates are ascribed to it, yields collective goals of increasing complexity. Our main task is to answer the question, "What makes a goal collective?"
I. Introduction
The notion of collective goal has been used in various senses.
Goals can in general be regarded as analogous to wants or desires on the one hand, and to intentions on the other. 1 In our view, intentions form a subclass of goals, and in standard cases they have actions as their contents. In this paper, we will first proceed from goals that represent wants to goals that are equivalent to full-blown intentions.
Due to our emphasis on the collective acceptance of goals, our account is related to contractualist ideas in social and political philosophy. Already Rousseau distinguished between private will, the will of all, and general will. General will represents the true interests which everyone has as a member of although we do not want to legislate that the members ought to form and then conform to such a goal, we accept that there are hierarchies of goals. Our policy is first to sort out different types of (collective) goal, and next, given such a goal, to study what "subgoals", if any, the members ought to form. Here we arrive at the obligations that may ensue from the acceptance of a collective goal.
In this paper, collective goals are approached along two dimensions. We proceed from mere want-like goals to intended goals. The other, and more central distinction, is between private and collective goals: We will also proceed along the private -collective dimension and end up with, what will be called, full-blown intended collective goals. To this end we will first present some relevant principles for the classification of goals. We will show how a given specific goal state, 3 when various additional predicates are ascribed to it, may yield different goals of increasing complexity.
Consider, for example, the goal that the window is (or will be)
open. It can represent the want of a private individual, or it may stand for a constituent of his intention, in which case its satisfaction necessarily involves his action, i.e., his seeing to it that the window is open. On the other hand, also other members can have this goal, which does not, as Rousseau pointed out, yet amount to their "general" or "corporate will", or, in our terminology, to their collective goal, unless still further criteria, to be discussed in detail below, are met. Yet, in principle, this same example can be applied in each of the analyses to follow. Another example to be applied later is the goal to go to the opera. A member can perform this goal alone or together with others. On the other hand, the goal can be satisfied for one member only, it can be satisfied for every member, or it can be satisfied for the group. These distinctions will be further elaborated in the next section.
In the literature related to our topic one can find detailed analyses of collective intentions, beliefs, commitments, acceptances, agreements, obligations and rights, preferences and
interests. An analysis of a general collective pro-attitude covering these notions would be welcome. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a general analytic account of collective goals which, while not reducible to any account of the above notions, at least in some form involves them all. Our main focus in this paper is to find answers to the question:
"What makes a goal collective?" Our classifications and analyses serve their purpose if they can give answers to this question.
II. Classification of Goals
In this paper, goals are analyzed as pro-attitudes the content
of which describes what the agent wants, and we will concentrate on intended goals. Both action goals and state goals will be discussed, although we employ the latter as paradigm cases, and the actions of agents can be considered as means to achieve the goal states (cf. endnote 2). Our emphasis is not only on intended goals, but also on collective goals as opposed to private ones.
Before discussing collective goals in any further detail, we will first present a typology in which goals are classified by their carriers and contents, and then we will apply the typology to a concrete example. To keep things simple, the universe of discourse will consist of two agents X and Y, and one goal state P. P is taken to represent the state that the window is closed, G is the goal operator, the subindex in G x stands for X as the goal carrier, and P x represents that X is the agent of the goal state P, so that, e.g., G x P x denotes "X's goal is that X (himself) closes the window." (Or keeps the window closed, as the case may be.) G xy denotes that X and Y have a goal together, and P xy denotes that X and Y act together to achieve P. Thereby we obtain four types of possible goal contents which are determined by the necessary satisfaction conditions of the goal.
In addition to the four types of goal contents, we get three types of goal carriers, and resulting twelve goals:
Classification of goals by their contents and carriers: P P x P y P xy G x 1 2 3 4 G y 5 6 7 8 G xy 9 10 11 12
Cases 1, 5 and 9 do not require that any of the two agents acts, alone or together, to bring about P. In these cases the goal is just that P will become true, no matter how or by whom, and these goals often represent mere wants, as intentions of either party need not be involved. In terms of our example, case 1 stands for X's goal that somebody (or something) closes the window, and analogously for Y in case 5. In case 9 both agents jointly have this goal.
The satisfaction of any of the cases 2, 3 or 4, entails that 1 is satisfied, but 2, 3 and 4 cannot be jointly satisfied. In terms of our example, 2 stands for X's goal that he himself closes the window, 3 for his goal that Y closes the window, and 4 for his goal that they close the window together. Analogous relations hold between cases 5-8 and also between cases 9-12.
Conjunctive cases like 1&5, 2&6, 3&7, and 4&8 are common, and they represent what later will be called shared private goals.
For example, 2&6 stands for their independently shared goal that X closes the window. Disjunctive goal contents with any two or three of P x , P y , and P xy as disjuncts are not infrequent, together to achieve it. In our example the agents together have the goal that they close the window together. To satisfy the goal, both the agents are collectively committed to see to it that P. If they have made an explicit or implicit agreement to this effect, this case yields mutual rights and obligations for the parties.
Next we will define six new notions relevant to collective goals:
(a) Goal P of an agent X is shared if and only if (X believes that) there is at least one other agent who has goal P and they believe that they have it.
(b) Goal P of an agent X is dividable if and only if (X believes that) there will, or at least can, be parts or shares for at least one other agent to bring about (or sustain) P.
(c) Goal P of an agent X has collective content if and only if (X believes that there is a mutual belief that) P is satisfied for X if and only if it has to be satisfied for a plurality of X's group members sharing P.
(d) Goal P of an agent X is in the we-mode relative to group g (or X has P in the we-mode) if and only if, X is functioning qua a member of g, X intends or wants to satisfy (or participate in the satisfaction of) P at least in part for g (viz. for the use of g).
(e) Goal P of an agent X is in the I-mode (or X has P in the Imode) relative to group g if and only if X is not functioning qua a member of g, and he intends or wants to satisfy P for himself.
(f) Goal P of an agent X is in the private mode (or X has P privately) if and only if he is not functioning qua a member of any group, and he intends or wants to satisfy P only for himself.
In this section we concentrate on cases (a)-(c). The above cases (a), (b), and (c), have objective and subjective versions, and either version (or both) can be applied depending on the case.
The subjective versions are given in parentheses. The d-type goals will be analyzed in detail in section III, where the wemode attitude towards a goal is discussed, and where strongly collective goals are analyzed. These strong collective goals are truth equivalent to shared collective intentions.
Before going into the first three cases, a few general comments on we-mode and I-mode goals. A many person shared we-mode goal is obtained from definition (d) as follows:
(WM) Agents A 1 , …, A m forming a group g share the goal to satisfy a content P in the we-mode if and only if P is collectively accepted by them as the content of their collective goal and they are collectively committed to satisfying P for g.
In (d) the "qua-a-member" relation was applied. (WM) partly analyzes this relation. We could say that if one acts because of his we-mode goal, he acts qua a group member. Accordingly, wemode basically applies to the participants' intentions and goals, and qua-a-member applies to their actions. Given that there is a part for each agent to perform, the we-mode of the goal entails that the they intend to participate to satisfy the goal together with the others. And if a participant then acts qua a member, he does not independently happen to perform a part, but he performs his part as his part of the joint goal. As the we-mode also entails that the participants are collectively committed to what they have accepted, it has a guiding and controlling function.
Given that there is a goal P so that (WM) is satisfied, then P is available for the group, and each member can correctly use locutions like "it is our goal that P". 5 When X acts in the wemode, he acts as a group member. On the other hand, given that there is goal P so that (e) or (f) is satisfied, agent X can correctly use locutions like "it is my goal that P", and when (f) is satisfied, X cannot correctly express himself by "it is our goal that P". Accordingly, every private goal is also an Imode goal, but not conversely. On the other hand, a person can have goal P simultaneously both in the I-mode and in the wemode. However, X's we-mode goal entails neither that he has or that he has not the corresponding I-mode goal.
What about the relation between I-mode and we-mode collective attitudes 6 in general? In a summary fashion we can conclude that they satisfy at least the following theses: T1) If X has an attitude that P in the I-mode, it does not entail that he has, or that he has not, an attitude that P in the we-mode. T2) If X has an attitude that P in the we-mode, it does not entail that he has, or that he has not, an attitude that P in the I-mode.
As a corollary from either T1) or T2), we get:
T3) An attitude can be simultaneously had in the we-mode and in the I-mode.
The properties (a)-(c) can be combined so that, for example, shared goals with collective content will result. Case (a) represents shared goals. 7 If a goal is (objectively) shared, the goal contents are the same and the agents believe so. If this latter requirement is dropped, we obtain goals that are "shared" in ignorance. These independent "goals of all" are typically private and less applicable in accounting for the collectivity of goals. The conjunctive case 1&5 would be an example of this. Besides having collective content, X's collective goal often has a collective origin which can be revealed by tracking the "history" of the collective goal. The collective goal might have been the result of, and engendered by, an action of collective decision or acceptance. This will be discussed in Section IV.
Before going on with our analysis of collective content, two things should be noted.
First, it is not presupposed that what the pro-attitude "is about" will in fact ever exist or be true. This basic idea has taken various forms at least since Brentano, and it has been applied to the contents of, e.g., intentions, expectations, and wants. As (having) a goal is taken to be a pro-attitude, we also accept it for the contents of goals.
Second, the content of any pro-attitude, here the content of a collective goal, is defined by its conditions of satisfaction.
These conditions describe, roughly, "what it would be like if the pro-attitude (goal) were satisfied." Accordingly, describing these conditions amounts to the same as describing the content of the goal. Therefore, it is an appropriate task to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for satisfying a collective goal content.
By tabulating types a, b and c, we obtain eight new types of goal: The first goal is one which is shared, dividable, and has collective content. This is "the most collective" goal based on these predicates. An agreement-based goal to write a joint paper would be an example of this case. The eighth goal is one which is unshared, not dividable, and has private content. This goal cannot be collective in any sense. My present goal to make a sandwich is an example of this case. Between these two there are six other cases of differing "degrees" of collectivity. We will not discuss these any further here, in part because these are not the only features that account for the collectivity of goals.
III. Intended Collective Goals
In this section we introduce three 9 importantly different notions of a collective goal, of which the second will be further analyzed:
1) collective goal based on shared "we-wants" (or "we-goal")
2) (intended) collective goal
The first is the weakest notion, in which the central connecting "social glue" is the participants' mutual belief. It does not even require that the members intend to achieve the goal. Wants are intentional in the "aboutness" sense, but one can want something without intending to achieve it. Thus, some people may have as their goal to attend a certain opera performance, believing that the others in the collective also have that goal and also believing that this is mutually believed in the collective. This goal can be merely want-based, but it can also become intended.
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The next strongest notion is the intended collective goal. It involves the participants' intention to achieve the goal, Accordingly, an intended collective goal is a goal in the wemode.
Let us now turn to the third notion, i.e. to a collective's intended goal to perform an action. The difference between the first two and this notion is that the collective's goal is not ascribed to individual members but to the group or collective itself. For example, a state can have as its goal to conquer a certain territory. Basically, at the level of the members of the collective, this can involve at least two quite different things, indicating two different senses in which a collective can intentionally have a goal. First, and this is the "normative" or group-binding sense, the collective may have a decision-making system (an "authority system" in the terminology of Tuomela, 1995, Chapter 4) by virtue of which the goals are jointly agreed upon for the collective. Secondly, a collective can be said to have an intended goal to achieve something if its members -or a majority of them -share at least a weak weintention in the sense of our category 1) above.
Over and above collective goals in the senses 1)-3) there are what might be called "mere" shared goals -states or actions which are private goals of several agents.
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Presently we focus on collective goals which are stronger than those discussed in the beginning of the previous section. First, we will discuss only intended goals, particularly concentrating on case 2) introduced above, i.e. on intended collective goal.
Second, the goals we consider will be goals in the we-mode (cf.
(d) above). We will soon give a more precise characterization of the notion of a we-mode. As a first approximation we can say that we-mode goals can be expressed by locutions like "we accept P as our goal", "P is our goal", or "we will achieve P". (For a more explicit linguistic criterion for a we-mode goal, see
Let us next discuss intended collective goals. We may consider a shared goal of reducing the ozone hole. Most of the people who share the goal have never met and may not plan on getting together for joint action to achieve the goal. Yet they have a belief that many others share the goal. Indeed, there is a mutual belief about this at least in the sense that they believe that the others believe that many others have that goal. The goal holders must be prepared to somehow contribute to their goal, active endorsement may be enough, if they genuinely hold it.
Intended collective goals satisfy a principle called the Collectivity Condition (CC) for goals (cf. Tuomela, 2000, Chapter 2):
(CC) It is necessarily true that if P is satisfied for a member X i of G it is satisfied for every member of G.
(CC) concerns only unstructured groups where the having and the satisfaction of the goal distributes to the members.
12 An in addition, that the above condition is mutually believed in G.
Let us use 'Sat' for satisfaction, 'MBg' for mutual belief in G, and '-> N ' for necessary implication. Then Sat(X i ,P) requires, not only that P is true but also that X i believes so (CC.5) Sat(X i ,P) <-> N MKg(Sat(X i ,P)).
Although the above four conditions do not entail (CC.5), it is normally required that it be satisfied for the following reason.
Suppose that it would be possible for X i to satisfy P for himself without the other members being aware of this. Then the satisfaction of P could hardly be the satisfaction of a shared collective goal. Therefore, we assume that a shared collective goal is satisfied for a member X i only if this is mutually believed, and mutually known, in G. Accordingly, we assume that the implication from left to right in (CC.5) holds. For an argument, suppose that (CC.5) would be false and yet a collective goal would be satisfied for him. We would have a case where X i had satisfied the collective goal for himself while the other members are not (mutually) aware of this. Even if this
were not conceptually impossible, we assume that like a private intended goal cannot be satisfied without the agent's being aware of this, also the satisfaction of a collective goal presupposes collective awareness. For a discussion of this requirement, see also Cohen, Levesque and Smith (1997) 
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. We distinguish between satisfaction of the goal and truth of the goal content P. The truth of P, although necessary, is not sufficient for the satisfaction of the goal. Therefore, although the agents cannot satisfy their goal without being aware of this, the goal content can become true without their realizing it.
The implication from right to left is trivially true. If we replace 'X i ' in (CC.5) with 'everyone', we get the equally obvious:
(CC.6) Sat(everyone,P) <-> N MKg(Sat(everyone,P)).
As conditions of collective goal satisfaction, each of the theses (CC) and (CC.1)-(CC.6) is assumed to be true "on quasiconceptual grounds," that is, true due to collective acceptance.
This notion will be discussed in more detail below. Before turning to collective acceptance, let us briefly discuss the notion "satisfaction for the group." In each of the seven theses above, the satisfaction of P has been taken from the point of view of individual members.
To discuss satisfaction for the group, let us return to the original Collectivity Condition (CC). In the above notation it comes out as follows (as above, the collective acceptance condition is assumed to be satisfied):
(CC) Sat(X i ,P) <-> N Sat(everyone,P).
Compare next (CC) with the following:
Given collective acceptance, (CC.7) says that "if P is satisfied for G, then it is satisfied for every member of G," whereas the original (CC) says that "if P is satisfied for a member X i of G, then it is satisfied for every member."
The first thing to note is that (CC.7) does not entail (CC), even though X i is "one of everyone," i.e., a member of G.
According to (CC.7) the satisfaction of P for G entails its satisfaction for every member. Accordingly, P cannot be satisfied for the group unless it is satisfied for (each of) its members. (CC.7), although not "logically" true, is a reasonable assumption, at least when small groups are concerned, but (CC. 7) can hardly serve as an independent criterion for the collectivity of P. According to (CC.7), the satisfaction of P for the group is not required (is not presupposed or necessary)
for the satisfaction of P for the individual members. Therefore, (CC.7) allows for the possibility that the members satisfy P for themselves, privately and independently of the others, and accordingly it is false that (CC.7) entails that P is a collective goal, i.e. (CC.7) is not sufficient for the collectivity of P.
It can be argued that (CC.7) is not necessary for the collectivity of P, either. At least in the case of large structured groups, P can be satisfied for the group without its being satisfied for every individual member, even open dissidents can be tolerated.
16
However, if (CC.7) is replaced with the requirement that the satisfaction of P for the group requires that it is satisfied for some member(s), we would get a necessary criterion, but not a very informative one.
Accordingly, although (CC.7) is often plausible at least for small groups, it provides neither a sufficient nor a necessary criterion for the collectivity of P. Therefore, let us turn to the converse of (CC.7) which we consider a better candidate for a criterion of collectivity:
(CC.8) Sat(everyone,P) -> N Sat(G,P).
According to (CC.8) the satisfaction of P for every member entails its satisfaction for the group. Accordingly, P cannot be satisfied for the members unless it is satisfied for the group. (CC.9) Sat(G,P) <-> N Sat(everyone,P).
(CC.9) may be true of collective goals in various small groups.
We will not discuss (CC.9) in any detail here. Note only that not even (CC.9) entails (CC), i.e., (CC.9) does not entail "Sat(X i ,P) <-> N Sat(everyone,P)". The entailment would require that in addition to the valid "Sat(everyone,P) -> N Sat(X i ,P)" which together with (CC.9)
implies "Sat(G,P) -> N Sat(X i ,P)", the truth of (CC.10) Sat(X i ,P) -> N Sat(G,P) must be assumed. 17 Besides being a necessary link between (CC) and (CC.9), (CC.10) appears to provide another viable criterion of collectivity, and can be strengthened to (CC.11) Sat(G,P) <-> N Sat(X i ,P), which, together with collective acceptance, inseparably joins together the satisfaction of P for X i and for G: P's satisfaction for an individual member entails, and is entailed by its satisfaction for the group. (CC.11) is weaker than the original (CC), because it does not require satisfaction for every member, but it is also stronger, because it requires group-level satisfaction.
With (CC.1) -(CC.11) the basic relations between the three notions -i.e., goal satisfaction for an individual, for all, and for the group -have been covered. These distinctions are parallel to Rousseau's distinctions between particular will, the will of all, and general (or corporate) will. Above we have studied some relations of these in terms of their conditions of satisfaction.
As the theses stand, there is no straightforward connection between the satisfaction for the group and the other two notions, which in turn are directly related. The important thing to note, however, is that the reason why the theses hold is that the members of G collectively accept P as their goal; due to their collective acceptance they, if they are rational, "implicitly accept" that theses ( Note that for a goal to be satisfied for a participant in a full subjective sense, we must require more than the objective occurrence of the goal-state due to the participants' action in accordance with their presupposition of the goal. We must, of course require -analogously with the case of intentional action -that the participant in question believes that the goal has thus been satisfied and, given (CC), also believe that it has similarly been satisfied for the others.
Our Collectivity Condition relies on the notion of collective acceptance. Therefore, a brief discussion of this notion is in order. Collective acceptance of a proposition or a sentence, s, amounts to consenting (collectively or individually) to collectively hold and maintain to hold s. It can be argued that this, more specifically, amounts to coming to collectively hold and holding a relevant we-attitude, where the relevant weattitude is a we-intention or a we-belief in the we-mode. A
person's we-intention (either in the individual mode or in the we-mode) to satisfy a sentence s (e.g., of the kind s = We will perform action A together) entails that he intends to satisfy s, or participate in satisfying s, while believing that the others in the group also share this intention and also that there is a mutual belief in the group about such sharing (cf. Tuomela 1984, and Tuomela and Miller 1988) . A person's we-belief that s amounts to his believing that s holds, and also believing that there is a mutual belief about this in the group. A we-attitude in the we-mode entails, in addition, that it is a relevant sense "for the use of the group", and that the participants are collectively committed to s. If a sentence is accepted for the group, then each group member can "correctly assert" (and act on the sentence) and in this sense use the sentence in group contexts, when acting as a group member. The acting in question includes making relevant inferences, and acting on those inferences. He is entitled to infer, e.g., from "we will do X"
and "we mutually believe that X requires our performance of Y"
to "I, as a group member, will contribute to our performance of Y".
The collective acceptance of a goal-expressing sentence, e.g., s = We perform action A together, accordingly need not amount to more than the group members acquiring an intention towards s and the two beliefs mentioned above in the definition of a weintention, as long as the we-mode of the intention, intended goal, and beliefs is preserved. The we-mode of the intention, in particular, partly means that the person intends to participate in the group's (or from his point of view "our") doing A together (or, more generally, sharing a goal P). He does not privately have the intention but only qua a group member.
Suppose the group somehow dissolves. Then no we-mode intention exists and the persons only and, at most, have I-mode intentions towards P (e.g., the reduction of the ozone hole).
The we-mode also entails that the participants are collectively committed to what has been accepted. Thus it has a steering and controlling function.
Collective acceptance thus need not be based on any events prior to the coming about of the fact that there is a shared we- acceptance can also be based on prior agreement or plan to accept some goal as the group's goal. Another possibility is that the participants rely on a relevant pre-existing social norm requiring that a goal of a certain kind be adopted for the situation in question.
Our I-mode and we-mode goals are related to a distinction made by W. Sellars. In his 1968 he employs subindices 'I' and 'we' in his intention-forming Shall-operator, thereby obtaining two different modes of intending, and he writes: "The functions of the indices is performed in ordinary language by the contrast between 'from a personal point of view' and 'from the point of view of the group' or, of more interest, 'from a moral point of view'." (note 1, p.218). As for the contrast between the personal and the group's point of view, our account of the wemode and the I-mode distinction is similar to Sellars's distinction. However, his main interest is in the moral aspect of we-intentions, and thus in the case in which the group in question is "mankind generally" (p. 220). Therefore his latter distinction between the personal and the moral point of view is not directly connected to our analysis. Although we discuss obligations and rights in the next section, these are related to all kinds of agreements and need not be moral in the general sense.
Due to the emphasis on the moral aspect, Sellars' account resembles Rousseau's contrast between the will of all and the general will discussed in the beginning of this paper (cf. also Ripstein, 1999, p. 221-222) . As Rousseau pointed out: "There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter concerns only the common interest, while the former takes private interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills" (Rousseau 1762, Book II,
Ch.3).
If we replace Rousseau's interest with intended goal, our shared I-mode goal would entail Rousseau's will of all, and his general will would entail our we-mode goal. However, not any we-mode goal would qualify as an example of such general will. For example, we-mode goals can result from any particular agreement, but the general will, if it ever exists, is not consistent with any agreement. What is agreed upon can represent a mere corporate will, which lacks the generality and impartiality of the general will. For Rousseau, the general will seems to be "general" in two respects. In terms of our classification, the goal carriers are all the members of the civil society. On the other hand, its content is general: It concerns the general principles of future interaction of the citizens. (Of this latter aspect cf. Ripstein 1999, p. 223-224 .) Accordingly, the general will not only "comes from all" but also "applies to all". Let the above suffice for the general principles of the Social Contract, and next we will turn to collective goals based on any "contract" or agreement.
IV. Collective Acceptance As Agreement
We began by discussing weak want-based collective goals, and now we will turn to a discussion of a strong case: collective goal based on agreement. Above, following Tuomela (2000), we characterized collective acceptance as a broad notion covering the joint holding of a relevant we-attitude with a collective commitment to its content. Here we adopt a more restricted view which, however, fits within the confines of that broad view.
Presently, we consider collective acceptance as an action. Let CA(G,P) represent G's collective acceptance of the goal P for the group G. CA(G,P) represents external activity ("event" or "process" that can be described in overt terms). Below we will assume that CA(G,P) entails agreement making. 18 In the present sense, the collective acceptance of a goal for the group is an umbrella term covering explicit and implicit agreements like, e.g., signing explicit agreements, promising and accepting promises, spontaneous suggestions and reactions to these, nonverbal gestures and nods of approval, etc.
In Austinian spirit, we can speak of performatives here. Before the shared collective goal P emerges, interaction, typically linguistic, normally takes place between the members. The participants construct collective goals for the group by their conceptual activities, by their collective acceptances and allowances.
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Here we call this activity the "collective acceptance of P." The fact that the agents have the collective goal P is the necessary result (in the standard sense of action theory) of this collective approval: If the members did not have P as their collective goal, it would be false to say that they collectively accepted P as their collective goal. Thus the following is valid:
(1) CA(G,P) -> N Goal(G,P)
Here we need not assume the converse implication. What all cases of agreements have in common is that, if they are to count as a collective acceptance of a collective goal P, it must be the case that the members have the collective goal P as a result.
As an example of a collective acceptance of a collective goal Suppose, for an example of (2), that it is true that X and Y have reached an agreement that Y will mail the letter. Then it must also be true that they mutually believe that they have reached the agreement that Y mails the letter. Besides explicit agreements, (2) also holds true of collective acceptances of goals due to, e.g., spontaneous suggestions or offers, nonverbal gestures and nods of approval, etc. However, no list of examples satisfying (2) proves that it is generally valid. Therefore, one should concentrate on finding an example where (2) would be false: An example where the members of G have (intentionally) accepted P as their collective goal without their being mutually aware of this. As we do not have any such example in the offing, we let (2) stand as it is. The mutual awareness, here MB, is allowed to be of varying degrees, but at least some degree of reflexive consciousness, over and above the mere shared belief, is required. Therefore, although collective acceptance is above treated as a performative, and not just an attitude, it gives rise to a collective epistemic attitude. Collective acceptance thus gives rise to both a conative attitude concerning the content of what has been accepted (i.e. P), and an epistemic attitude concerning the fact that they have accepted P as their collective goal, i.e., CA(G,P).
Unlike the conative attitude, the (collective) epistemic attitude (here mutual belief), does not concern the content of what has been agreed upon. That the members also (mutually) believe that the goal content will become true is considered the "default", but this (mutual) belief is not implied by the fact that the members have accepted the goal. Because the content of the epistemic and the conative attitude is not the same, "splitmind" cases -the agent believing that it is not likely that the goal content will become true, and yet in another "mode"
believes that it will -are avoided.
Given that P has been collectively accepted and X shares the collective goal that eventually P will occur, his main doxastic premise in his practical reasoning is not his belief that eventually P occurs, but his belief that they have accepted P as their goal and that this is mutually believed in his group, i.e., the following is valid:
The proof of (3) applies a "fixed-point" property of mutual belief:
Thesis (2) G,P) ) & MB g (CA(G,P))), i.e., thesis (3).
The consequent of (3) is X's ordinary factual "we-belief" having the fact that P has been collectively accepted for X's group and the fact that this is mutually believed as its content. Speaking of collective acceptance involving agreement making, as X believes that they have collectively accepted P, he is also aware of the duty-right bonds between the members as specified and established by the concrete "deal" that has been agreed upon, and he believes that there is a mutual belief to this effect. Thus, for example, because of and relative to the existence of the agreement, he is aware of what, if anything, he himself ought to do, and he is aware that this is mutually believed.
The norm to keep an agreement does not emerge with the agreement but it is "already there": As a full-fledged member, X knows that in his community there are rules according to which an agreement or a promise ought to be kept, i.e., he understands what agreements are. He has "internalized" these rules (and other analogous principles; cf., e.g., Scanlon's Fidelity Principle, 1990, 208) . Thereby, he also understands that these rules also apply to the fact that they have collectively accepted P as their collective goal, that this fact is an "instance" of the rule which he already has learnt.
Social norms and rules are not designed for a particular individual, rather they are "general"; they concern every member or any holder of a position. The general rule for agreements could be expressed in a disjunctive form as follows: One ought:
either not to make an agreement or do what one has agreed to.
Once X has entered an agreement, and understands what he has done, he is aware that the general rule now "subsumes" him under an obligation to act. Then the general rule not only "restricts" him, what it always does, but now also "coerces" him. This is often expressed by locutions like "he is now under an obligation to do so".
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Let us now return to the collectivity condition, (CC):
(CC) It is necessarily true if P is satisfied for a member X of G, then it is satisfied for every member of G; and this is mutually believed in G.
Consider the following attempt to formalize the collectivity condition where x ranges over the members of G:
What (CCa) amounts to is: Given that the members have collectively accepted P as their goal, it is true that P either is satisfied for no member or it is satisfied for every member, and according to (CCb) the members mutually believe that P either is satisfied for no member or it is satisfied for every member.
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We will not try to assess here whether the "objectivist" (CCa) or the "intersubjectivist" (CCb) version would better account for the collectivity of goals. Together (CCa) and (CCb) cover the central content of (CC), but there does not seem to be any relation of entailment between them.
However, provided that we can accept the following doxastic counterpart of (CCa):
then, given thesis (2), i.e., CA(G,P) -> N MB g (CA(G,P)), and (CCc), i.e., MB g (CA(G,P)) -> N MB g (¬(∃x)Sat(x,P) ∨ (x)Sat(x,P)), we get 2 We-mode goals will be discussed in detail below, see in particular section III.
3 In this paper, both action goals and state goals are accepted. Both have generic content, but they become satisfied by singular actions or states (perhaps repeatedly). The satisfaction of the former presupposes the agent's action, while the mere obtaining of the goal state will satisfy the latter. The satisfaction of the former typically presupposes that a goal of the latter type is also satisfied: the obtaining of the goal state amounts to the necessary result without which the action could not have been accomplished. 4 Cavendon, Rao and Tidhar (1998), following Castelfranchi (1995) , analyze the notion of social commitment which is to be distinguished from collective commitment proper (for collective commitment in general cf. also Tuomela and Bonnevier-Tuomela, 1997 , and for a formal account of both individual and collective commitments cf. Miller and Sandu, 1997) . Social commitment is a normative notion involving an obligation on the part of the socially committed agent. Castelfranchi introduced the notion of social commitment which is a relational notion that mediates between individual commitment and collective commitment. We can apply this notion to account for cases 10 and 11 on p. 4. In the notation of Cavendon et al. case 10 comes out as SCOM I (X,Y,P) which means that X is intention-committed to Y to see to it that P. Let us study this case in terms of a simple example of promising. (For a more general account, not involving explicit promise, cf. Thomas Scanlon's "Fidelity principle" (Scanlon, 1990, p.208) .)
Asymmetric cases analogous to the above example are quite common, but do they represent collective goals? Do X and Y share a collective goal in our example? In terms of our classification, X and Y have together the goal that P x and the goal that P (recall that case 10 entails 9). Given that SCOM I (X,Y,P) holds, there does not seem to be any reason to deny that X and Y share a kind of collective goal. This goal is also normative in the sense that it involves X's obligation to see to it that the content of his promise, i.e., P, will come true, and Y's right to expect that this indeed will happen. P is for the group. This sentence expresses a collective attitude for us in this situation if and only if it is true for us that Goal(we,P) entails and is entailed by CA(we,Goal(we,P)), where CA means our collective acceptance involving collective commitment to Goal(we,P). In other words, the sentence "Our goal is P," expresses a we-attitude (for us) if and only if this sentence is collectively accepted and, in addition, entails and is entailed by the sentence, "We collectively accept (for us) to achieve P in the sense goals are satisfied." (See Tuomela, 2000, Ch. 2, and Tuomela and Balzer, 1999 , for a discussion.) 7 Sharing a goal or intention can be analyzed in many various ways. Here it is taken "minimalistically" as the agents having the same goal content and believing so. Bratman (1993) analyzes "our" shared intention to J as requiring that we each intend "that we J" by way of our "meshing" and mutually reason-dependent sub-plans of which there is mutual knowledge. According to Velleman (1997) , sharing an intention amounts to a kind of joint decision and a concomitant agreeing about a combination of intention expressions.
8 Describing the content of a goal amounts to describing the satisfaction conditions of the goal. If X's goal P has collective content, then, according to (c), X cannot satisfy P for himself without satisfying it for the other individual members. Consider the following suggestion related to (c): (c') Goal P of an agent X has collective content if and only if X believes that, necessarily, P is satisfied for X if and only if P is satisfied for his group. According to (c'), X cannot satisfy P for himself without satisfying it for his group. Here the notion "satisfaction for the group" is left unaccounted for, and it will be given alternative analyses, differing in strength, in the next section. 15 Although not formulated in terms of conditions of satisfaction, Cohen and Levesque and Smith (1997 p. 99) , have a related epistemic theorem of joint persistent goals: Should the agent learn that P has become true and believe that this is not known to the group as a whole, he is not through with his commitments yet. He is still committed to make the status of P mutually believed by all the members. Not only the satisfaction, but also the having of the joint goal should be mutually believed: If the members would lack this mutual belief, they would lack the motivation to act in concert.
16 For a discussion of group actions and goals of organized groups see Tuomela, 1995, Chapters 5-6 , where the roles of authority systems and operative members in the formation and bringing about of collective goals are discussed. Cf. also below, note 15. 17 In the case of structured groups, such as organizations, some restrictions to the applicability of (CC.10) are worth noting. First, X i does not stand for any member of G, but any such member who has P as his goal. And, second, all members who have the goal P share a collective goal if their goal satisfaction entails the satisfaction of P for the group. 18 As noted earlier, collective acceptance can be taken in a broader sense which need not involve even implicit agreement making. For example, standing collective goals need not involve agreement making, and yet they can be in the we-mode, and thus involve collective commitment to satisfying the goal content. It can be argued that also these we-mode goals satisfy the theses of section IV. For simplicity, we will below discuss only cases of agreement making.
19 This is a somewhat idealized account of the adoption of collective goals, and it depends on what "collective" acceptance means: It is, of course, trivially true that each goal holder somehow must have "accepted" the goal because he now has it. Yet this acceptance of the goal need not take place collectively even though the content of the goal is collective (collective in the sense discussed above, i.e., that an individual's satisfying the goal is inseparably connected to the collective's satisfying it). Our standing collective goals have typically been gradually adopted or learned. 20 Whether the converse implication also holds is another matter. In general it seems that the answer is negative. The main reason for a negative answer is that whether an agreement has been made is not entirely up to what the participants (mutually) believe. For example: whether a "formal" contract indeed has been made or not (is valid or not) depends on whether it satisfies criteria that are "fixed" in the community at large, criteria which the parties may mistakenly believe to be satisfied. 21 For a defense of obligations related to shared intentions in general, see Gilbert, 2000b; and related to agreements, Gilbert, 2000a, p. 59-61 . However, as Gilbert invariably presupposes the existence obligations, her account is not correct as an analysis of the weaker notions of collective goal discussed above. On the other hand, according to Bratman (1993) , there are cases (e.g. coercion, Bratman's case 1) where neither party has any obligation towards the other to satisfy the shared end. It seems doubtful, however, whether these cases can represent a joint commitment of any kind. Likewise, if the parties reserve every right to "opt out" for any reason (Bratman's case 2) without informing the other, how possibly could the parties be jointly committed to the shared end?
22 A third more refined alternative would be the following: CA(G,P) --> G (¬(∃x)Sat(x,P) ∨ (x)Sat(x,P)) Given that the members have collectively accepted P, it is true for the members qua members that P either is satisfied for no member or it is satisfied for every member. Thus, given that the antecedent is true, according to '--> G ' the consequent is true within the collective's "intentional horizon". For '--> G ', cf. Tuomela and Balzer, 1999. 21 As is well known, there are influential traditions in economics and social science, at least from Adam Smith onwards, according to which the invisible hand is the true embodiment of a general will, which our intentional collective goals can only approximate. Also typical functional explanations in sociology are excluded by our criterion. Still another related idea of general will is familiar from the philosophy of history. According to Hegel, it is "the cunning of reason" that it plays on the "blind" private wills and lures these to serve its purposes, purposes which yet represent the true collective will of the group (of the "nation", etc.) of which the collective can be more or less aware depending on the state of its "self-consciousness."
22 Analogous theses apply to actions in the we-mode and in the I-mode.
